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BENDING THE HEALTH COST CURVE: 
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF THE 
INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY 
BOARD 
 




Underlying today’s and the future’s health-care reform debate is a 
consensus that America’s health-care financing system is in a slow-
moving but deep crisis: care appears substandard in comparison with 
other advanced industrial countries, and relative costs are exploding 
beyond all reasonable measures.  The Obama Administration’s Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) attempts to grapple with 
both of these problems.  One of ACA’s key instrumentalities is the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board—the IPAB, designed to 
discover and authorize ways to reduce the rate of growth of Medicare 
and other categories of health spending.  The IPAB is a peril.  Expert 
boards to perform regulatory tasks in the interest of efficiency and 
social goals always run a high risk of being captured by the industry 
they are supposed to regulate.  Even should it succeed at its task of 
reducing the rate of growth of Medicare spending, who is to say that 
the reductions will not come at a heavy cost in reduced quantity and 
effectiveness of medical care?  But the IPAB also has promise.  The 
need for a better process than our current specialist-driven one to 
assign value to the medical services provided by Medicare is great.  
The bellwether status of Medicare payment systems means that 
commercial insurance consumers and payors would also benefit 
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mightily from bringing more coherent, technocratic, and cost-
effectiveness oriented logic to this process.  And the current system of 
relative Medicare reimbursement rates is, in the judgment of many, 
currently well out of whack.  We quail when we consider the 
magnitude of the tasks the IPAB faces—even its initial task.  
Nevertheless, we remain optimistic that this administrative agency 
will manage to bend the long-run healthcare cost curve and moderate 
future price increases. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction .....................................................................................77  
I.    Background: The Road to ACA ...................................................82  
A.   Yesterday’s Medicare Debate ...............................................82 
B.   Today’s Health-care Reform Debate.....................................84 
C.   A Poorly-Performing Health-care System.............................85 
D.   Tomorrow’s Reform of the Health-care Financing System ..87 
II. The Logic of ACA .......................................................................89  
A.   Dealing with the Problem of Uninsurance ............................89 
B.   Reducing the Deficit: Revenues from ACA..........................90 
C.   Bending the Medicare Cost Curve through the IPAB ...........92 
III. The Independent Payment Advisory Board .................................93 
A.   Origins of the IPAB...............................................................93 
B.   The Operation of IPAB .........................................................96 
IV.  IPAB and the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule ........................99 
A.   The Importance of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule ....99 
B.   What Is the Problem to Which IPAB Is the Solution? ........101 
C.   IPAB: Can It Work? ............................................................102 
1.   The Sustainable Growth Rate Formula .........................102 
2.   Will IPAB Do Better than MedPAC?............................103 
 3.   IPAB’s Governance .......................................................104  
V. IPABs Principal Assignment......................................................105 
A.   Relative Value Units ...........................................................105 
B.   The RVS Update Committee...............................................107 
C.   Why Medicare Physician Reimbursement Relative  
 Value Units Should Matter to IPAB....................................108 
D.  Reforming RUC...................................................................111 
E.   The Physician Payment Sustainable Growth Rate   
 Formula................................................................................115 
VI. Constitutional Challenges to IPAB ............................................118 




2012] BENDING THE HEALTH COST CURVE 77 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Underlying the current and future health-care reform debate is a 
consensus that the American health-care financing system is in a 
slow-moving but deep crisis. 
 
 
It is conventional wisdom among health policy analysts that over 
the past generation America’s hybrid health-care system has fallen far 
short, measured against the yardstick of health-care expenses and 
outcomes in other developed economies.  Figure 1 shows an 
especially striking slice of the cross-national comparative quantitative 
data.1  Up until the end of the 1970s, the United States was, in both 
life expectancy and health expenditures, in the outfield but still in the 
ballpark relative to its natural yardstick countries.  Since the start of 
the 1980s, the United States’ trajectory has diverged: life expectancy 
  
 1 Lane Kenworthy, America’s Inefficient Health-Care System: Another 
Look, CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE (July 10, 2011), 
http://lanekenworthy.net/2011/07/10/americas-inefficient-health-care-system-another-
look/. 
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has risen more slowly and health costs have ballooned much more 
rapidly than in the natural yardstick countries.2 
The reaction to this slow-moving but deep crisis over the past 
generation has been recurrent cries for and attempts to pass 
comprehensive health-care reform not just to improve access to health 
care and improve the quality of health care but also to “bend the cost 
curve”—to control rising costs.  The latest attempt to reform 
America’s health-care delivery and financing systems is the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). The three most 
important foci of the ACA were indeed (1) to improve access to health 
care, (2) to improve the quality of health care, and (3) to control costs. 
The principal instrumentality for this third goal of the ACA is its 
establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), 
an administrative board whose principal initial task will be the reform 
of Medicare’s procedure-based reimbursement system.  Medicare 
pricing is notoriously byzantine and poorly understood. It is also 
desperately important for long-run cost control. It is not an 
overstatement to say that the long-term viability of social insurance in 
America depends on whether IPAB is able to successfully manage 
Medicare pricing.  
This Article attempts to lay out the IPAB’s assigned tasks, and 
assess its ability to succeed.  That is best accomplished by telling the 
story of how Medicare currently organizes physician payment, and 
how it is to be reformed.  We quail when we consider the magnitude 
of the tasks the IPAB faces—even its initial task.  Nevertheless, we 
remain optimistic that this administrative agency will manage to bend 
the long-run health-care cost curve, and moderate future price 
increases. 
Our current political debate about health care is really three 
debates.  
The first is a debate about the proper reach of the social insurance 
state: how much access to how much medical care do we wish our 
health-care financing and delivery systems to provide, particularly for 
  
 2 The natural yardstick countries for the United States consist, generally, of 
other western industrialized countries: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, Australia, 
and New Zealand on the Asian Pacific Rim.  Similar patterns of demography, levels 
of prosperity, access to technology, and political economy suggest that outcomes 
attainable in any of these countries should also be attainable in others.  It is worth 
noting that the Canadian federal government and the Canadian provinces are also 
working to develop a balanced and sustainable health-care growth rate through the 
development of a federal-province escalator formula tied in some way to Canada’s 
GDP.  See Randall Palmer, Canada Seeks a Way to Limit Health-Spending Increases, 
REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2011, 5:19 PM),  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-
canada-health-spending-idUSTRE7BD2CO20111214.  
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those with limited means?  The second is a debate about how much of 
a role the government will take in the health-care financing and 
delivery systems: In other words, markets or bureaucracies?  
Government as backstop or provider?  Decentralized or centralized? 
The subject of this Article is the third debate: How much health-
care spending can Americans afford?  And, in the end, how do we 
structure our health-care financing system so that we do not conclude 
that the ambitions of the social insurance system are quite literally 
unaffordable? Today’s political debate about health-care reform is 
thus about our desire and ability to “bend the cost curve” as a decisive 
factor in the future of government-funded, supported, and regulated 
health insurance.  
This third debate is especially important because the American 
health-care system delivers less bang for more buck than do the 
health-care financing and delivery systems of the natural yardstick 
nations.  American patients are less healthy and pay more. Successful 
health-care reform and successful health-care policy management 
must require a more efficient health-care financing system.  That is 
what the ACA’s cost-control provisions are intended to produce. 
At the heart of the ACA’s cost-control provisions is the IPAB.3  
From 2015 on, in any year which the Medicare Actuary forecasts that 
net spending growth will exceed target levels, the IPAB is charged 
with developing specific proposals to bring the net growth in 
Medicare spending back to target levels.4  The IPAB is forbidden 
from raising taxes, increasing Medicare premiums, increasing 
Medicare co-payments or deductibles, or in any way rationing health 
care.5  Given all these things that the IPAB cannot do, what can the 
IPAB do?  The low-hanging fruit that the IPAB is intended to first and 
most importantly pick is to alter the process by which Medicare sets 
its outpatient reimbursement rates.6  
The functioning of the IPAB will be an experiment by Congress 
  
 3 See Henry J. Aaron, The Independent Payment Advisory Board — Con-
gress’s “Good Deed”, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2377, 2378 (2011). 
 4 From 2015 to 2019, the target growth rate will be based on a synthesis of 
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (“CPI-U”) and the medical care 
expenditures category in the CPI-U.  From 2020 forward (based on determination 
year 2018 data for proposal year 2019 and implementation year 2020) the target for 
spending will be linked to the growth in the national gross domestic product (“GDP 
per capita”) plus one percentage point.  The transition to a Medicare growth rate 
linked to GDP per capita will occur first by linking to growth in health-care prices 
and, eventually, by linking to growth in the larger economy. 42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
 5 Id. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 6 See Aaron, supra note 3, at 2378. 
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in binding itself to the mast, as Odysseus did when confronted by the 
Sirens.   In the past Congress has exercised its discretion to reject—or, 
rather, to fail to act on—proposals to reform Medicare reimbursement 
rates put forward by entities Congress created to advise it.  The belief 
is that the IPAB process, which removes much of Congress’s 
discretionary authority not to act over recommendations on rates, will 
lead to Medicare payment decisions that are closer to the social 
optimum.7  
This ambitious attempt to reform Medicare physician payments 
via the IPAB is also the weak point of the ACA.  It carries all of the 
tension between collective overconsumption and overspending on the 
one hand and less-than-socially-optimized individual choices on the 
other.8  How can the IPAB’s proposals slow the growth of Medicare 
spending without imposing an unacceptably high cost in terms of 
reduced quality or amount of care?  The IPAB, if it works, will 
harness the enormous purchasing power of the federal Medicare 
program for the task of bending the cost curve not just for Medicare 
alone but for health care in general by reworking physician payment 
standards.  But if it is to work at acceptable cost it must trigger 
improvements in the efficiency of the health-care delivery system and 
not just say “no” to cost increases.9  
The long-run effects of the IPAB on health-care costs—if the 
Board survives, and if its implementation is successful—are projected 
to be enormous.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects 
that, as of 2040, federal expenditures on health care will be lower by 2 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—or $600 billion each 
  
 7 Congressional authority to delegate power under broad general directives 
is grounded in the understanding that complex technical problems may require dele-
gation of legislative power in complex technical areas.  See generally Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (recognizing that increasingly complex tech-
nical problems may require Congressional ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives). 
 8 The problem of distributive justice is particularly acute in a society where 
health-care expenditures exceed 16 percent of GDP.  The inherent difficulty of alloca-
tive decisions is enhanced by our society’s insistence that allocative decisions are not 
made—by patients, providers, and payors—on a daily basis.  The Long-Term Outlook 
for Health Care Spending, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/maintext.3.1.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 
2011). 
 9 Cf. Edmund F. Haislmaier, Compromising Quality: The High Cost of 
Government Drug Purchasing, HERITAGE FOUND. 2 (May 25, 2004), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2004/pdf/bg1764.pdf (arguing that government 
intervention in the prescription drug market through market access controls dimin-
ishes health-care quality). 
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year—because of the successful implementation of the ACA.10 If 
these forecasts are accurate, the IPAB would slow the growth in costs 
of today’s existing federal health-care programs by a third over the 
next generation, with the savings coming overwhelmingly from 
Medicare.11 
The IPAB is a peril.  Expert boards to perform regulatory tasks in 
the interest of efficiency and social goals always run a high risk of 
being captured by the industry they are supposed to regulate.  Even if 
it should succeed at its task of reducing the rate of growth of Medicare 
spending, who is to say that the reductions will not come at a heavy 
cost in reduced quantity and quality of medical care? 
But the IPAB also has promise.  The need for a better process 
than our current specialist-driven one to value the medical services 
provided by Medicare is great.  The bellwether status of Medicare 
payment systems means that commercial insurance consumers and 
payers would also benefit mightily from bringing more coherent, 
technocratic, and cost-effectiveness oriented logic to this piece of the 
American government.  And the current system of relative Medicare 
reimbursement rates is, in the judgment of many, currently well out of 
whack. 
  
 10 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11579/06-30-LTBO.pdf 
with CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2009), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10297/06-25-ltbo.pdf.  The CBO does not 
make it easy for its readers to untangle just how Congressional actions and changes in 
the economic environment interact to change its estimates of the long-run path of 
federal spending and revenues.  However, Table 1-3 on page 15 of the Long-Term 
Budget Outlook for 2010 shows a drop in the projected 50-year extended-baseline 
fiscal gap between program spending and revenues from 2.6 percent of GDP pro-
jected in June 2009 to 0.8 percent of GDP projected in June 2010.  THE LONG-TERM 
BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010), supra.  On the revenue side, revenues are boosted by the 
ACA’s tax on high-cost health plans.  Id. at 37.  On the spending side, even the intro-
duction of subsidies so that low- and moderate-income households without employer-
sponsored insurance can afford to purchase health insurance via the ACA’s Ex-
changes and the remarkably-large expansion of Medicaid under the ACA are pro-
jected to be offset by other savings.  Id. at 36.  The only place that such significant 
other savings could possibly come from in the CBO’s budget arithmetic is from the 
effects of the IPAB in bending the cost curve of federal Medicare spending. 
 11 Savings would come secondarily from reduced Medicaid expenditures.  
Improved efficiency in the health-care system would mean that more elderly would be 
able to afford their Medicare cost-sharing without having to draw on Medicaid.  If 
Medicare does indeed serve as a “price leader” in the antitrust sense and private in-
surance companies key their reimbursement rates to Medicare rates, there will be 
additional savings to the Federal government that will come from reduced subsidy 
payments to low-income Americans purchasing health insurance through the state-
level health exchanges.  However, these potential savings are speculative, and are not 
included in CBO estimates. 
82 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 75]  
We quail when we consider the magnitude of the tasks the IPAB 
faces—even its initial task.  Nevertheless, we remain optimistic that 
this administrative agency will manage to bend the long-run health-
care cost curve and moderate future price increases. 
 
I.    BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO THE ACA  
  
A. Yesterday’s Medicare Debate 
 
The origins of our current health-care dilemmas as they affect the 
federal budget—especially related to Medicare’s provider 
reimbursement system—are found in the 1960s.  The presidential 
election of 1964 had powerful consequences.  Democratic President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson not only won election over Republican 
nominee Barry Goldwater, Johnson carried with him the largest 
supporting congressional majorities since Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.12 
One major consequence of Johnson’s victory was the 
establishment of Medicare and Medicaid.  These two programs 
transformed America’s health-care financing system from a system 
funded by private charity, out-of-pocket payments, and private 
insurance (for those lucky enough to work for large and high-wage 
businesses) to the hybrid system we have today.13  Currently, half of 
America’s health-care financing system is composed of this mix of 
charity, out-of-pocket, and insurance.14  The other half is comprised of 
the federal single-payer system for elderly and some disabled persons, 
called Medicare, and the federal/state single-payer system for poor 
and most disabled persons, called Medicaid.15  Together, they bring us 
materially closer to providing a safety net for Americans who find 
themselves in need of health care, but lack the financial resources to 
pay for it. 
  
 12 Given the role played by Barry Goldwater’s decision to challenge estab-
lishment Republicans like George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller in creating the 
Democratic-heavy legislative environment in 1965 and 1966 that enabled the creation 
of Medicare, there is some irony in the role of the Goldwater center’s active presence 
in today’s court cases seeking to hobble the reform of Medicare.   See generally 
Complaint at 30-31, Coons v. Geithner, No.2:10cv1714 (D. Ariz., May 10, 2011) 
(challenging Congress’s creation of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) 
as an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional powers to an unelected, unac-
countable executive agency). 
 13 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 
147–49, 369 (1982). 
 14 Peter Landers, Public Share of Health Tab to Top 50%, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
4, 2010, at A1. 
 15 LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 1, 26 (2010). 
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As the bill that was to establish Medicare and Medicaid moved 
through Congress in 1965, President Johnson sought to derail a 
threatened American Medical Association (AMA) boycott of his 
program.  Johnson decided to offer doctors participating in Medicare 
generously-structured payment rules with little government 
oversight.16  Doctors would report to the government what they 
charged their non-Medicare patients for the services they provided to 
Medicare patients, and the government would pay the bill.  There was 
no bureaucracy to intrude into doctors’ practices, and there were no 
accountants to demand a discount for the large buyer that was the 
nationwide government program.17 
The particular minimal-supervision payment rules Johnson 
established did not survive beyond the early 1980s.18 Nevertheless, 
Johnson’s decision to establish this particular Medicare provider 
reimbursement system still casts its shadow over Medicare and is one 
major source of the current projection fiscally-unsustainable Medicare 
cost growth.19  If IPAB succeeds, it will switch us off of the track that 
  
 16 DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: 
HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 201 (2009). 
 17 In part, this was a response to rent-seeking by well-organized doctors 
looking to preserve their incomes and fearing the long-run effects of becoming an 
industry subject to heavy government regulation.  On the one hand, the government 
was promising to boost demand by paying for their services.  On the other hand, the 
government seemed likely to extend control.  For an overview of how groups like 
doctors are successful in manipulating the government in such situations, see 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1966).  The ideological reaction 
to Medicare proposals was remarkably intense, as was the political heat. Consider 
Representative Hallock of Indiana’s claim that after the passage of Medicare it would 
be impossible to preserve freedom for long in America: “We do not want socialized 
medicine . . . . When the American people wants [sic] something from Congress, 
regardless of its political complexion, if they make their wants known, Congress does 
what the people want . . . .” Eric Zorn, Ronald Reagan on Medicare, Circa 1961. 
Prescient Rhetoric or Familiar Alarmist Claptrap?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE BLOG (Sept. 2, 
2009, 2:00 PM), 
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2009/09/ronald-reagan-on-
medicare-circa-1961-prescient-rhetoric-or-familiar-alarmist-claptrap-.html.  Ronald 
Reagan agreed, and warned that “behind [Medicare] will come other federal programs 
that will invade every area of freedom as we have known it in this country until one 
day, as Norman Thomas said, we will wake to find that we have socialism . . . . [W]e 
are going to spend our sunset years telling our children, and our children’s children, 
what it once was like in America when men were free.”  Id.  
 18 As discussed below, in the 1980s the U.S. government began to tighten its 
control over Medicare payments in an attempt to standardize valuation of care in a 
process led by Dr. William Hsiao of the Harvard School of Public Health.  See infra 
Part V.A. 
 19 As of 2007, before the beginning of the latest health-care reform debate, 
the CBO was projecting that in the absence of fundamental reforms to the federal 
laws governing the Medicare and Medicaid programs, “[f]ederal spending on Medi-
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Johnson started us down in 1965.   
 
B.   Today’s Health-care Reform Debate 
 
The three debates that make up our current struggle over health-
care reform are conducted at three very different levels of generality. 
The first is a debate about moral philosophy.  Whose 
responsibility is it to assemble the resources to pay for the medical 
care that we will all seek over the course of our lifetimes?  How much 
of the cost of medical care should properly rest on the individual 
seeking care?  Does our answer to this change depending on whether 
the diseases needing treatment are “in the genes,” “in the lifestyle,” or 
appear to be simply accidental bad luck?  How much of the cost of 
medical care should rest on groups of individuals, using private 
insurance companies as instrumentalities to voluntarily associate with 
one another to pool and spread risk?  And how much of the cost of 
medical care is within the proper reach of the social insurance state—
particularly for those with limited means?  These questions of 
individual responsibility and social justice raised in this debate are 
important, divisive, and unresolved.  We cannot deal with them in this 
paper. 
The second is a debate about the proper boundary between the 
market and the state.  Historically, there have been some areas from 
which we have broadly excluded the market. Americans have always 
elected or had their elected officials appoint judges and police chiefs, 
we have not bought judicial services from the lowest bidder, or 
allowed the low-bidding private security company to exercise the 
police powers of the state.  Similarly, our military has always been a 
military of volunteers or conscripts, and not an assembly of mercenary 
companies.  Education and health care, too, have historically been 
overwhelmingly provided by nonprofit or public institutions rather 
than by for-profit corporations.  Even health insurance was, until 
recently, largely nonprofit and mutual.  While in much of our society 
it is taken for granted that the market will provide, health care has 
been somewhat different.  Should it have been?  Should it still be?  
The second debate is about how much of a role the government ought 
to take in health-care financing and delivery systems.  Should the 
government be a provider or merely a financer?  Should the system as 
  
care (net of beneficiaries’ premiums) and Medicaid would rise from 4 percent of GDP 
in 2007 to 7 percent in 2025, 12 percent in 2050, and 19 percent in 2082.”  State 
spending on Medicaid would be in addition to federal spending.  CONG. BUDGET OFF., 
THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdf.  
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a whole be decentralized or centralized?  How much do we trust 
markets, and how much do we trust bureaucracies?  Once again, these 
questions raised in this debate are important, divisive, and unresolved.  
We cannot deal with them in this paper. 
The subject of this Article, then, is the third debate.  How much 
health-care spending can Americans afford?  And, in the end, how do 
we structure our health-care financing system so that we do not 
conclude that the ambitions of the social insurance system are quite 
literally unaffordable?  The fact that the American health-care system 
delivers less bang for more buck than do the health-care financing and 
delivery systems of the natural yardstick nations creates a rebuttable 
presumption that we are, in some way, doing it wrong. It would be 
understandable—a coherent social choice—if American patients were 
less healthy but paid less.  It would be understandable if American 
patients were more healthy and paid more.  But Americans are less 
healthy and pay more. 
This fact leads to the conclusion that, no matter what the results or 
positions are in debates one and two, there is space for a health-care 
reform and successful health-care policy management that will 
produce a different and more efficient health-care financing system.  
That is what the ACA is intended to produce.  The ACA largely 
ducked the first two debates, creating a complicated public-private 
system that could accommodate nearly any set of answers to those 
two.  But it does seek to push the health-care financing system in the 
direction of greater efficiency—because the need is urgent. 
 
C.  A Poorly-Performing Health-care System 
 
Our current hybrid health-care system leaves us at any particular 
moment with about 50 million Americans without any form of health 
insurance coverage.20  As best as economists can determine, 
America’s uninsured get perhaps half the care standard for other 
  
 20 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty and Health In-
surance Coverage in the United States: 2010 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html.  
Before the recession, over a typical four year period, approximately twice as many 
Americans experienced a gap in insurance coverage as suffered from one at any sin-
gle point in time. Before the recession, about two-thirds as many people as those 
uninsured at any point in time lack coverage more than half the time. The recession 
beginning in 2008 altered these patterns in ways impacting the reliability of these 
types of predictions.  See, e.g Pamela Farley Short, Deborah R. Graefe & Cathy 
Schoen, Churn, Churn, Churn: How Instability of Health Insurance Shapes Amer-
ica’s Uninsured Problem, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 4-5 (Nov. 2003), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Short_churn_688.pdf. 
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Americans.21  The consequence is that Americans achieve worse 
health outcomes than do the citizens of any other rich, industrialized 
country. Americans’ life expectancy at birth now lags behind the 
industrial country average by approximately four years.22  It is true 
that the life expectancy gap is due in part to relatively unhealthy 
aspects of the contemporary American lifestyle.  Smoking, poor 
nutrition, and suburbanization have taken their toll.23  But the gap in 
life expectancy has grown far larger over the past generation even as 
smoking rates have declined, nutritional standards have improved, and 
suburbanization has remained constant.24 
Moreover, the uninsured receive a disproportionate amount of 
their health care at relatively expensive, low follow-up emergency 
rooms, and thus get their care in a way that guarantees low value-for-
money.25  This contributes to the other aspect in which American 
health care falls well short: America’s health-care costs are much 
higher than in other countries.  However, other contributing factors 
are even more important.  The U.S. system has extraordinarily high 
administrative costs relative to other nations, because insurance 
companies face enormous bottom-line incentives to deny payment for 
even the most necessary and appropriate care.26 The U.S. system 
compensates and uses the most expensive medical care providers—
specialists—at a rate vastly exceeding other economies.27  Health 
  
 21 Catherine Hoffman, Anthony Damico & Rachel Garfield, Research Brief: 
Insurance Coverage and Access to Care in Primary Care Shortage Areas, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. 1 (Feb. 2011), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/8161.pdf. 
 22 See Kenworthy, supra note 1. 
 23 EXPLAINING DIVERGENT LEVELS OF LONGEVITY IN HIGH-INCOME 
COUNTRIES 3-4 (Eileen M. Crimmins, Samuel H. Preston, & Barney Cohen, eds., 
2011) available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13089 (describing how 
the built environment, including the development of suburban housing designed pri-
marily for automotive access, has implications for morbidity and mortality).  
 24 See generally Gary King & Samir Soneji, The Future of Death in America, 
25 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1 (July 1, 2011), http://www.demographic-
research.org/volumes/vol25/1/25-1.pdf. 
 25 See, e.g. Sarah Miller, The Effect of Insurance on Emergency Room Visits: 
An Analysis of the 2006 Massachusetts Health Reform 3, 6 (University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign Working Paper Series, Sept. 1, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1711502. 
 26 See Mark J. Browne, Evidence of Adverse Selection in Health Care Mar-
kets, 59 J. RISK & INS. 13, 27 (1992); see also Scot J. Paltrow, Insurers’ Black Box: 
Now-Secret Claims Denied Rates Could Tell Consumers a Lot About Their Insurance 
Company, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/insurers_black_box.pdf. 
 27 See generally AMITABH CHANDRA & KATHERINE BAICKER, THE 
PRODUCTIVITY OF PHYSICIAN SPECIALIZATION:  EVIDENCE FROM THE MEDICARE 
PROGRAM (2004), available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~kbaicker/BaickerChandraSpecialists.pdf ; see also CHRIS 
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policy experts argue about the impact of pressure to provide more and 
more sophisticated care that is reinforced by the medical malpractice 
system.  The general consensus, though, points instead to a lack of 
knowledge and consensus about which procedures and protocols are 
actually effective and appropriate.28  One informed guess indicates 
that about one-third of all care provided carries a social cost greater 
than the benefit to the patient. Another informed guess states that a 
substantial part of health-care spending is at best neutral from the 
perspective of likely patient outcomes.29  
In addition, the performance of the American health-care system, 
relative to other countries, is likely to become worse over time. Nearly 
all projections anticipate that American medical costs will also 
continue to rise, and at a rate faster than that of other industrialized 
economies.30  
 
     D.  Tomorrow’s Reform of the Health-care Financing 
  System 
 
Breaking this trend—bending the cost curve—is thus essential. 
Bending the cost curve means making changes to the health-care 
delivery and finance system to decrease the rate at which health-care 
spending increases.31  Even in the universe of government funded 
  
L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34175, U.S. HEALTH 
CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 41 (2007), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf. 
 28 DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 107 (2004); the book’s immensely valuable techni-
cal appendix is also available at 
http://economics.harvard.edu/faculty/cutler/files/technical_appendix.pdf.  See gener-
ally LEIGHANNE OLSEN ET AL., LEARNING WHAT WORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED 
FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 57 (2011), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12214 (providing an overview of the 
many publications that have highlighted the limited quality of the evidence developed 
to guide health-care decision makers). 
 29 Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform: A Graphic Novel, BOSTON GLOBE, 
http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/health/gallery/health_care_graphic_novel/ (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2012).  See also Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in 
Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 
2130 (2010).  Perhaps 75,000 people a year in America die from medical error.  Ellen 
Nolte & C. Martin McKee, Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an Earlier 
Analysis, 27 HEALTH AFF. 58, 63 (2008). 
 30 See, e.g. 2011 Global Medical Trends Survey Report, TOWERS WATSON 
(2011),  http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3585/Towers-Watson-Global-
Medical-Trends-Svy-Rpt.pdf.  
 31 Though the origins of the phrase “bending the cost curve” are obscure, 
William Safire attributes the migration of the aviation reference to being behind the 
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health insurance, Americans are uncertain who can bend the cost 
curve, and for good reason.  Short of absolute fiat, the health-care cost 
curve will not improve without changes in provider, payor, and 
consumer behavior. In a hybrid public/private health-care system—
such as our own—many private players have a role in determining 
government funded health-care expenditures.  It is a collective action 
problem,32 amenable only to collective, systemic solutions to 
overcome collective overconsuming and overspending.33  
In the absence of successful implementation of comprehensive 
health-care reform, observers have noted five features of the ongoing 
process of health-care cost growth.  
First, rapidly-rising publicly funded insurance health-care 
expenditures are not being driven by a shifting of costs away from 
private payors —charity, out-of-pocket, and private insurance—to the 
public.  Private and public costs and expenditures are rising in 
tandem, with the public side, if anything, better at achieving 
efficiencies and evading cost-shifting in health-care provision.34  
Second, the destructive adverse selection arms race among the 
private insurance companies and others continues, with the company 
that does least well paying a disproportionate share of the bills, and 
winding up in the red.  The result is that much of the increase in 
health-care costs on the private side is directed towards administrative 
overhead in order to further exploit adverse selection.  There are, so 
far, no signs that this arms race has come to an end or even stabilized 
at a constant proportional share of health-care expenditures.  The 
incentives in the current system for insurers to find ways not to pay 
for the sick, and for the healthy to find ways not to pay into the 
system are simply too great35. 
  
power curve to no one less than President Obama himself. William Safire, Bending 
the Curve, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at MM14. 
 32 Austin Frakt, Bending the Curve: Conflict and Skepticism, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2010, 10:00AM), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/bending-the-curve-conflict-and-
skepticism/. 
 33 Id. 
 34 CONG. BUDGET OFF., KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH 
INSURANCE REFORM PROPOSALS 19 (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/12-18-KeyIssues.pdf. 
 35 See generally Karen Eggleston & Anupa Bir, Measuring Selection Incen-
tives in Managed Care: Evidence From the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance 
Program, 76  J. RISK & INS. 159, 161 (2009) (explaining how capitation only exas-
cerbates insurer cherry picking); see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for 
the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks Into the Health Insurance Pool With An Idea 
From Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. LAW REV.79 (2010) 
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Third, the growing gap in life expectancy between rich and poor 
Americans strongly suggests that the care gap between the insured and 
the uninsured is growing as well.36 
Fourth, the aging of the population and the resulting increase in 
per capita costs of care as those suffering from the diseases of aging 
become a larger and larger share of the population—while very real—
is not a primary driver of increased costs.37 
Instead, fifth, the principal driver of anticipated system-wide cost 
increases is the creation and deployment of additional medical care 
technologies and protocols.  Physicians and insurers are the 
gatekeepers who decide when and how additional medical care 
technologies and protocols will be deployed38. 
 
II.   THE LOGIC OF THE ACA  
 
Thus the ACA is motivated by a desire to fix the two major 
deficiencies of the American health-care financing system measured 
against the yardstick of other OECD economies.  
 
A.   Dealing with the Problem of Uninsurance 
 
The ACA proposes to address the problem of the uninsured’s lack 
of access to affordable care by, first, a large expansion of the 
federal/state Medicaid program.39 This will definitely not reduce 
health-care costs: providing 15 million people with financing so that 
they can go to the doctor more often is not a cost-reducing measure.  
The ACA proposes, second, to address the problem of the middle 
class uninsured’s inability to purchase affordable insurance by 
creating fifty state-specific health exchanges, each of which will 
increase bargaining power and mitigate adverse selection.  The hope 
is that these reforms will increase competition in the health insurance 
  
(discussing the one-third of young men who will not voluntarily purchase health 
insurance). 
 36 EXPLAINING DIVERGENT LEVELS OF LONGEVITY IN HIGH-INCOME 
COUNTRIES, supra note 23, at 117. 
 37 LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING, supra note 19, at 3.   
 38 Christine Lane & Barbara J. Turner, The Good (Gatekeeper), the Bad 
(Gatekeeper), and the Ugly (Situation), 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 320, 320 (1999);  
Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Primary Care Physicians Should Be Coordinators, not 
Gatekeepers, 281 JAMA 2045, 2045 (1999); Melvin Kirschner, I Am a Physician, 
Don’t Call Me a Gatekeeper, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 3, 1995), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-03/local/me-41803_1_patient-care. 
 39 See Chris L. Peterson, Medicaid Coverage Expansions Under PPACA: 
Who and How Much, CONG. RES. SERV. (May 7, 2010), 
http://www.nhpf.org/library/handouts/Peterson.slides_05-07-10.pdf. 
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markets by diminishing the bargaining power of large insurers vis-à-
vis individuals and small groups.  If successful, administrative costs 
will fall greatly once community rating40 and the individual mandate 
reduce the incentive to engage in the adverse selection arms race. 
Private health-care costs will decline, as will government costs, to the 
extent that those purchasing health insurance on the exchanges or 
elsewhere benefit from the federal subsidy pool.  But the exchanges 
and the federal subsidy pool will also make it possible for 
approximately 20 million more people to go to the doctor more often.  
Once again, providing millions of people with financing so that they 
can go to the doctor more often is not a cost-reducing measure.41 
The cost-saving and deficit-reducing measures in the ACA are 
found elsewhere. 
 
B.  Reducing the Deficit: Revenues from the ACA 
 
Nobody knows how effective the ACA will be.  It depends on the 
details of implementation, the functioning of the health-care market, 
and future changes that are unknowable.  The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) has, however, projected the impact of the ACA which 
serves as a useful baseline and starting point.42  We consider the CBO 
projections below. 
One of the largest single projected effects of the ACA is a federal 
tax revenue increase of $600 billion per year by 2040.43  This increase 
is due to a substantial excise tax on “high cost” health insurance 
plans.44  This tax can be thought of as a partial reduction in the tax 
  
 40 Community rating requires health insurers offer every applicant in the pool 
the opportunity to purchase insurance at a uniform community-wide price.  The oppo-
site of community rating is found in products that are individually underwritten and 
individually priced.  Uwe R. Reinhardt, Is ‘Community Rating’ in Health Insurance 
Fair?, ECONOMIX: N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 1, 2010, 7:01 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/is-community-rating-in-health-
insurance-fair/. 
 41 Katherine Balcker & Amitabh Chandra, Misconceptions About Health 
Insurance Markets and Health Reform, TIAA-CREF INSTITUTE 2 (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.tiaacref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/documents/docu
ment/tiaa02029346.pdf. 
 42 CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 23-27 (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf; CONG. BUDGET 
OFF., CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 25 (2011), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/122xx/doc12212/06-21-Long-
Term_Budget_Outlook.pdf. 
 43 See THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010), supra note 10, at 61. 
 44 Note that the ACA’s “Cadillac Tax” excise tax on the excess costs high-
cost health insurance plans does not begin to take effect until 2018.  Jenny Gold, 
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preference provided to employer-sponsored health insurance, a 
reduction that will grow over time.45  As of 2040, if the ACA is fully 
implemented, and if its tax provisions are not suspended, postponed, 
or moderated, only about half of the health-care costs of those 
receiving employer-sponsored insurance will qualify for the current 
tax preference.  The other half will then take the form of either 
employee out-of-pocket expenses or employer payments via vehicles 
that do not qualify for tax preference.46 
This substantial excise tax on “high cost” health insurance plans is 
projected by the CBO to powerfully reduce the share of the federal 
deficit attributable to the health-care sector.47  The tax’s supporters 
hope that it will boost economic growth in other sectors by reducing 
the quantity of Treasury bonds issued by the government to cover its 
deficit.48   Households and businesses seeking to hold bonds will then 
find themselves with a powerful incentive to lend money to 
businesses seeking to improve efficiency and profitability through 
greater capital intensity, and that increased productive efficiency 
shows itself as faster economic growth outside the health-care 
sector.49  The magnitude of these economic consequences is greatly 
uncertain and a matter of political dispute.50 By convention, the CBO 
does not take these possible changes in economic growth into account 
in its projections. 
  
‘Cadillac’ Insurance Plans Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/March/18/Cadillac-Tax-Explainer-
Update.aspx. 
 45 For an argument about why it is very dangerous to eliminate the tax pref-
erence for employer-sponsored insurance at least until effective universal coverage 
has been established, see David M. Cutler, J. Bradford DeLong & Ann Marie Marci-
arille, Why Obama’s Health Plan Is Better, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A25. 
 46 Congressional Budget Office informal communication with authors.  Thus 
the “Cadillac” name of the excise tax on high-cost health plans is, in the long run, a 
misnomer.  The tax starts out as a tax on “Cadillac” health insurance plans, but as 
costs rise over time the tax applies to a larger and larger share of Americans.  It is 
unclear whether the legislative coalition needed to sustain this tax over the long run 
will maintain itself. 
 47 It is the driver of the CBO’s projected reduction in the fifty-year fiscal gap 
from the 2.6 percent of GDP that it forecast in 2009 to the 0.8 percent of GDP that it 
forecast in 2010. See THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2009), supra note 10, at 7; 
THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010), supra note 10, at 60. 
 48 Benjamin M. Friedman, Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic Con-
sequences of Financing Government Budget Deficits, 1978 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 593, 640-41 (1978). 
 49 See Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 
70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956). 
 50 See Alan J. Auerbach, Dynamic Scoring: An Introduction to the Issues, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 421 (2005). 
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This substantial excise tax on “high cost” health insurance plans 
does create some incentives for private insurers to “bend the health-
care cost curve” directly.  Formerly, insurance companies that devoted 
additional resources to marketing rather than cost control might well 
have found their profits increasing as a smaller proportional margin of 
prices over costs was spread out over a larger customer base.  Once 
the excise tax on “high cost” health insurance plans has gone into 
effect, however, failure to control costs would be heavily taxed.51  It 
would be more profitable to devote corporate resources to cost control 
rather than marketing in order to keep premiums below the cap at 
which the tax begins to bind. 
 
 C.  Bending the Medicare Cost Curve through the 
IPAB 
 
But the major projected bending of the health-care cost curve 
comes elsewhere in the ACA. The individual mandate prevents 
insurance companies from charging some households higher 
premiums while inducing other households to “go naked” without 
health insurance, to boost insurer profitability via adverse selection.52  
Such business practices come at the price of very high administrative 
costs. The ACA will eliminate them.53 This will bend the cost curve as 
far as the private insurance market is concerned. 
But, more importantly, the ACA through the IPAB is intended, 
and projected, to alter Medicare. The IPAB’s first major task is to 
alter the process by which Medicare sets reimbursement rates.  Thus, 
through the IPAB, the ACA is an experiment in binding ourselves to 
  
 51 If, indeed, the failure to control costs is the source of variation in health 
plan premiums.  There is some evidence that only some of the variation in cost of 
family coverage can be explained by actuarial value of the plan.  Jon Gabel et al., 
Taxing Cadillac Health Plans May Produce Chevy Results, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1, 5 
(2010). 
 52 LUCIAN WULSIN JR. & ADAM DOUGHERTY, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH 
BUREAU, CRB 09-007, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE: A BACKGROUND REPORT 3-4 (Apr. 
2009), available at www.library.ca.gov/crb/09/09-007.pdf; Achim Wambach, Ration-
ing Health Care and the Complementarity of Private and Public Insurance, in 
RATIONING IN MEDICINE: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS 127, 128-29 
(Friedrich Breyer, Hartmut Kliemt & Felix Thiele, eds., 2002) (discussing how ration-
ing by price in insurance markets is both an interesting and troubling phenomenon). 
 53 The importance of the individual mandate to acquire coverage is as a cen-
terpiece of any cost-growth reduction strategy.  See Matthew Buettgens, et al., Why 
the Individual Mandate Matters: Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues, 
URB. INST. 3, 6-7 (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412280-
individual-mandate-matters.pdf (illustrating that, without an individual mandate, the 
ACA would still cut the number of uninsured, but by less than 50 percent). 
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socially-optimal Medicare payment decisions by removing much of 
Congress’s discretion on these matters. 
The stakes are high.  The long-run effects of the IPAB are 
projected to be enormous.  This extraordinarily ambitious attempt to 
reform Medicare physician payments will serve as an object lesson, 
demonstrating the incredible tension between collective 
overconsumption and overspending on the one hand, and less-than-
socially-optimized individual choices on the other.  Consumers tend to 
recognize the need for rational decision making on Medicare spending 
allocation,54 at least until confronted with their own denial of 
Medicare specialty services. Specialty physicians align their interests 
with those of Medicare beneficiaries scared of being denied, in what 
Tom Daschle described as the “patient-provider pincer movement”55 
which is designed to maximize Medicare resources for those 
specialists.  The role of specialty physician payments in fueling 
Medicare cost inflation and the role of specialty physicians in shaping 
Medicare health-care delivery and outcomes reveal the strengths and 
weaknesses of trying to reform our hybrid health-care system.  
 
III.  THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD 
 
A.  Origins of the IPAB 
 
The IPAB is designed as an independent, executive branch board 
directed to recommend savings for Medicare if the per capita growth 
in Medicare spending exceeds defined target growth rates.56  These 
target growth rates are designed to bring Medicare’s growth rate in 
line with general inflation rates. 
 The IPAB’s scope of authority includes the mandate to issue 
recommendations to Congress to reduce Medicare’s spending growth 
rate.57  These recommendations are then fast-tracked for 
  
 54 Avik Roy, NYT/CBS Poll: Plurality of Americans Favor Reduced Medi-
care Spending, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/04/22/nytcbs-poll-plurality-of-americans-
favor-reduced-medicare-spending/. 
 55 TOM DASCHLE WITH SCOTT S. GREENBERGER & JEANNE M. LAMBREW, 
CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 114 (2008). 
 56 During its first five years, if overall medical inflation does not exceed 
general inflation, IPAB may not issue binding proposals but it may issue advisory 
recommendations.  Thereafter, IPAB must issue proposals if Medicare costs per bene-
ficiary grow faster than one percentage point per year plus GDP per capita, and may 
not if they do not.  James Ebeler et al., The Independent Payment Advisory Board: A 
New Approach to Controlling Medicare Spending, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 6 (Apr. 
2011), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8150.pdf. 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(2) (2010). 
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Congressional consideration.  If Congress does not act in a timely 
fashion, the recommendations must be implemented by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (HHS).  The IPAB’s provider targets 
go into effect in 2020, but exclude acute care hospitals.  Variously 
described as “recusal legislation,”58 governance by “self-
abnegation,”59 and “statutory entrenchment,”60 the IPAB’s default 
authority is the source of its power. 
Medicare is a creation of Congress and has been governed as such 
since its inception in 1966.  The governance process for Medicare has 
always been intensely political.  Congressional architects of 
America’s health-care policy have long feared Congress’s technical 
incompetence to deal with the highly complex issues of health-care 
spending. To help it deal with these issues, Congress thus created and 
has relied on its own highly-respected advisory body—the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).61  
 MedPAC resulted from the merger of the Prospective Payment 
Assessment Commission and the Physician Payment Review 
Commission (PPRC) in 1997.62  PPRC was established in 1985 to 
advise Congress on ways to adapt or replace the system used to pay 
for physician services with a prospective payment system.  Congress 
was the agent of physician payment reform, however, and PPRC 
merely offered analysis and advice on the scope and pace of 
implementation of physician payment system reform.63  
 MedPAC has maintained its credibility, but it has always been an 
advisory body, lacking real authority.  When push comes to shove, 
those whom its recommendations would disadvantage have lobbied 
Congress, and its recommendations for Medicare system 
  
 58 Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional 
Stalemate, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (2011). 
 59 Aaron, supra note 3, at 2377. 
 60 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory En-
trenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory, 120 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
ONLINE 387, 396 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/962.pdf. 
 61 The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) is an independ-
ent Congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to advise 
the U.S. Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program.  The Commission’s 
statutory mandate is quite broad: in addition to advising the Congress on payments to 
private health plans participating in Medicare and providers in Medicare’s traditional 
fee-for-service program, MedPAC is also tasked with analyzing access to care, qual-
ity of care, and other issues affecting Medicare.  Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. 
L. 105-33, Sec. 4022, H.R. 2015-100 (1997). 
 62 Ebeler et al., supra note 56, at 1, 23 n.6. 
 63 Thomas R. Oliver, Analysis, Advice, and Congressional Leadership: The 
Physician Payment Review Commission and the Politics of Medicare, 18 J. HEALTH 
POL., POL’Y & L. 113, 114 (1993). 
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rationalization and cost saving have not been implemented.64 
 In the summer of 2009, both Senator Jay Rockefeller and the 
Office of Management and Budget Director, Peter Orszag, proposed 
to strengthen MedPAC by making it into an executive branch 
commission with specific savings targets and authority, not just to 
make recommendations to Congress (which Congress would then 
ignore), but to initiate action.  Their proposals became what is now the 
IPAB: an independent board in the executive branch, consisting of 
fifteen members appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  The IPAB members cannot engage in any 
other employment; thus they cannot be otherwise-employed members 
of the health policy community.  Given the enemies that the IPAB’s 
cost-cutting recommendations are likely to make in the provider and 
insurance communities, members of the board are not likely to be 
employed in the future by providers or insurers.  An appointment to 
the IPAB is thus likely to be a career-ending, capstone position, at 
least for those of its members pursuing careers in health-care 
finance.65 
 The IPAB represents the latest, and strongest, iteration of an 
independent, expert panel dedicated to reducing the per capita rate of 
growth in Medicare spending.  Created by the ACA as the watchdog 
of target growth rates for Medicare, the IPAB will spring to life in 
2012. Based on the assumption that Congress and the federal 
administrative agencies have proven themselves too accommodating 
to the provider, payor, and consumer forces that propel an ever-
increasing Medicare spending growth rate, the IPAB is designed to 
limit the growth of Medicare spending as well as improve the 
governance structure for Medicare.66  Demonstrating what Henry 
Aaron has called the “legislative statesmanship” of “self-
abnegation,”67 Congress has insulated the IPAB from legislative 
intrusiveness68 as well as from constituent influence.69  
  
 64 See Ebeler, supra note 56, at 3. 
 65 The simultaneous requirements of substantive expertise and restrictions on 
other income-producing activity may help to account for the lack of nominees to date.  
Alternatively, it may make no sense to even attempt an appointment until the fate of 
the ACA is resolved at the Supreme Court.  Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief: 
The Independent Payment Advisory Board, HEALTH AFF. 2 (Dec. 2011), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_59.pdf. 
 66 Id. at 1. 
 67 Aaron, supra note 3, at 2377. 
 68 See id. at 2377-78. 
 69 Steve Benen, The Independent Advisory Board Comes Under Fire, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Apr. 20, 2011, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2011_04/029035.php. 
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According to David Nather of Politico, “IPAB has become a huge 
lightning rod.”70  Already, there are calls to strengthen the role of the 
IPAB71 and calls to repeal it.72  But it is a Medicare reform lightning 
rod for a variety of reasons.  The rhetoric of the IPAB’s supporters 
and detractors focuses on how it is designed to work, who will serve, 
and whether it will be effective.  
 
 B.  The Operation of IPAB 
 
The ACA sets target growth rates for Medicare spending 
beginning in 2014.73  These growth rate targets serve as triggers for 
IPAB’s authority to submit specific Medicare savings 
recommendations to Congress—but they are more than mere 
“recommendations” that Congress will then ignore.  Congress must 
respond or else the proposals automatically go into effect.74 
By the force of default implementation,75 the IPAB’s assignment 
is clearly to tame Medicare outpatient spending growth,76 and bring it 
  
 70 David Nather, Medicare Cost-Cutting Job Could Be Worst in D.C., 
POLITICO.COM (May 14, 2011), https:// 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/54952.html. 
 71 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 36 
(Dec. 2010), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/_photos/2010/12/01/TheMomentofTruth.pdf; Re-
marks by the President on Fiscal Policy, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/13/remarks-president-fiscal-
policy. 
 72 Cal. Health Care Found., Medicare Cost-Cutting Board Faces Mounting 
Opposition in Congress, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2011/4/18/medicare-costcutting-board-
faces-mounting-opposition-in-congress.aspx (citing Julian Pecquet, House Democ-
rats’ Defections Threaten Obama’s Medicare Advisory Board, HEALTHWATCH (Apr. 
15, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medicare/156343-
democrats-defections-threaten-obamas-medicare-savings-gambit). 
 73 For 2015 through 2019, Medicare spending per capita’s target is the aver-
age of general and medical inflation.  Brad Vaida, The IPAB: How Could It Change 
Medicare?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 8, 2008), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/May/09/ipab-faq.aspx.  For 2020 and 
later, the target is the gross domestic product plus one percentage point, though the 
President has floated a proposal to tighten IPAB’s target in later years to GDP plus 
0.5 percentage point.  Id. 
 74 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(3) (2010). 
 75 See Ebeler, supra note 56, at 9. 
 76 ACA’s exclusions of inpatient and outpatient acute care hospital services, 
inpatient rehabilitation, psychiatric facilities, long-term care hospitals, and hospices 
from IPAB scrutiny until 2020 leaves the focus of immediate IPAB scrutiny on Medi-
care Advantage, Medicare Part D, skilled nursing facilities, home health, dialysis, 
ambulance, ambulatory surgical center services, and durable medical equipment.  Id. 
at 10. 
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in line with general inflation rates while also maintaining or 
enhancing Medicare beneficiary access to quality care.  The goal is 
not to cap Medicare’s spending growth rate so as to align it with 
general inflation rates, but rather right-size it relative to other sectors 
of the economy.77  
 For 2015 to 2019, the target growth rate for Medicare spending 
per capita is the average of overall inflation and medical inflation.78  
Thereafter the target is one percentage point more than the per capita 
GDP growth rate.  Every year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) Actuary must determine whether the Medicare 
growth rate is exceeding the target growth rate.  If it is, the IPAB is 
required to develop and submit a proposal to bring Medicare spending 
growth below the target rate.79 
 The IPAB must submit its annual proposal for reducing Medicare 
spending growth by January 15.  If it fails to do so, the Secretary of 
HHS must submit a proposal meeting the requirements by January 25.  
In either event, the Secretary must transmit and MedPAC must 
comment on the IPAB proposal by March 1, after which the proposal 
is considered by Congress.80  In the event Congress does not act on 
the proposal, the Secretary of HHS is required to implement the 
recommendations for the subsequent fiscal year.81 
The tension between the IPAB’s obligation to monitor and master 
Medicare’s spending growth rate and its obligation to maintain or 
  
 77 Id. at 3. 
 78 Id. at 6. 
 79 A technical note: ACA does not strictly require IPAB to recommend pro-
posals to keep Medicare spending below target growth rates in all circumstances.  
Rather, it requires IPAB to reduce Medicare spending by the amount of the excess 
over the target only up to a specified percentage maximum that is unlikely to be 
reached.  The fear is that should costs explode for some unknown reason, IPAB 
would then be forced by law into draconian and counterproductive economies.  The 
Congressional architects of ACA seek to avoid that eventuality. 
 80 There has been very little discussion of the fact that the legislative lan-
guage appears to grant the Secretary of Health and Human Services the powers and 
authority of the IPAB in the event that the IPAB itself deadlocks and fails to carry out 
its mission.  The powers that Congress may delegate to an independent board are 
different than the powers Congress may delegate to a cabinet officer. 
 81 IPAB is prohibited from: (1) increasing Medicare cost sharing or premi-
ums; (2) rationing health care; or (3) restricting benefits or modifying eligibility crite-
ria.  It cannot reduce payment rates for providers and suppliers below levels already 
specified elsewhere in ACA until 2020.  In its first five years, therefore, IPAB is 
likely to focus on aspects of Medicare like durable medical equipment, dialysis, pre-
scription drugs, Medicare Advantage, and home health.  The savings that the CBO 
expects from the IPAB up until 2020 are thus not overwhelmingly large.  Afterwards, 
however, the potential for major reforms greatly increases.  See Ebeler, supra note 56, 
at 7-8, 10. 
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enhance beneficiary services is framed by the ACA’s limits on the 
IPAB’s authority.  The IPAB may not recommend rationing of health 
care, raising Medicare beneficiary premiums, cost sharing, or 
modifying eligibility criteria.  The joke that the IPAB is an acronym 
for “Death Panel” illustrates the concern and confusion over the 
IPAB’s statutory and regulatory role.82 The IPAB, as laid out in the 
ACA, is constrained in its choice of weapons to control Medicare 
spending growth.83  In addition, Medicare specifically withholds the 
power to regulate the practice of medicine from the federal 
government.84  All of this raises the question of whether the IPAB is 
too strong or not strong enough to accomplish its goal of bending the 
cost curve on Medicare cost inflation. 
 Congress must consider the IPAB’s proposals under special 
expedited procedures.85  The committees86 and the full House and 
Senate cannot consider any amendment that would change or repeal 
the Board’s recommendations unless those changes meet the same 
fiscal targets that the IPAB met (however, three-fifths of Senators can 
override this restriction).  The Senate must vote on the proposal by the 
end of no more than thirty legislative hours.87  The Senate must vote 
on any conference report or amendment by the end of no more than 
ten legislative hours.88 
The ACA and the economic realities of Medicare spending have 
thus set the stage for the IPAB’s first major assignment. Its initial 
agenda cannot include Medicare inpatient services. Its agenda is 
  
 82 See, e.g. David Catron, IPAB is an Acronym for ‘Death Panel’, AMER. 
SPECTATOR (Apr. 22, 2011, 6:09 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2011/04/22/ipab-
is-an-acronym-for-death-p. 
 83 See supra note 79. 
 84 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1801, 79 Stat. 
286, 291 (1965). 
 85 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(d)(4) (2010). 
 86 “When introduced in the House, an implementing bill is to be referred to 
House Committees on Energy and Commerce and on Ways and Means.  In the Sen-
ate, the measure is to be referred to the Committee on Finance.” “Fast Track” Par-
liamentary Procedures Relating to the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB): 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Health, 112th 
Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Christopher M. Davis, Analyst on Congress and the 
Legislative Process, Congressional Research Service), available at 
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Health/071311/Da
vis.pdf. 
 87 The thirty-hour decision deadline is tolled by the delivery of IPAB’s for-
mal recommendations from HHS to Congress.  Id. at 13-14. 
 88 Congress has reserved to itself the opportunity for a one-time fast-track 
joint resolution to dissolve IPAB in January of 2017.  Dissolving IPAB via fast-track 
requires: (a) passage by August 15, 2017; and (b) the votes of three-fifths of members 
in the House and Senate. Id. at 9, 16-19. 
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limited to payments reform. Given that, the intersection of Medicare 
outpatient services and payment system reform is found at the 
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS).  This makes it likely that 
the IPAB, at its launch, will focus on the MPFS.  The key question is 
how the IPAB might wield its power to tame Medicare spending 
growth. 
 
IV.   THE IPAB AND THE MEDICARE PHYSICIAN FEE    
 SCHEDULE 
 
 A.   The Importance of the Medicare Physician Fee  
   Schedule 
 
The architects of the ACA designed the IPAB to undertake 
reforming MPFS as a stepping stone to overall value-based payment 
reform. Migration of the health-care financing system to value-based 
payment will be neither easy nor quick.89 Value-based payment 
systems in the future are likely to build on the current MPFS; the 
current reimbursement practices are the most obvious place to start.  It 
is one of the few places where the stakes are large enough to bend the 
health-care inflation cost curve.The ACA proposes to slow Medicare 
spending growth through a comprehensive implementation of 
Medicare’s prospective payment system in the realm of physician 
services through the efforts of the IPAB.  As Gerard Anderson et al. 
observed, “[a]lthough the huge federal Medicare program . . . 
possess[es] some monopsonistic purchasing power . . . the highly 
fragmented buy side of the U.S. health system is relatively weak.”90  
The IPAB’s assignment is to harness some of the monopsonistic 
purchasing power of the federal Medicare program by reworking 
physician payment standards.  What role might the IPAB might play 
in the near-term revision of the MPFS? What limits are there to the 
IPAB’s capacity to rapidly take action to bend the cost curve on 
health-care inflation? 
Curtailing Medicare spending growth is not a novel goal.  But 
past efforts to contain Medicare spending growth on physician 
services have been notably less successful than, for example, efforts to 
  
 89 Robert A. Berenson, Out of Whack: Pricing Distortions in the Medicare 
Physician Fee Schedule, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND. 1 (Sept. 
2010), http://nihcm.org/pdf/NIHCM-EV-Berenson_FINAL.pdf. 
 90 Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is 
So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 102 (2003). 
100 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 75]  
contain Medicare spending growth for inpatient hospital services.91  
 Medicare operates on a system of administered pricing that, with 
varying degrees of success, has most recently attempted to slow 
spending growth by the use of prospective payment systems.  
Although much-maligned, Medicare’s prospective payment systems 
have had some success in slowing Medicare spending growth for 
inpatient services,92 transitory success in slowing Medicare spending 
growth for post-acute care,93 and little success in slowing Medicare 
spending growth for physician services.94  It is worth understanding 
why the effectiveness of Medicare’s prospective payment system has 
been particularly blunted in the areas of physician services.  The 
question is complex, as is the answer.  But it is worth asking because 
it is Medicare’s prospective payment system that has been most 
effective at slowing Medicare spending growth—not managed care, 
not changes in cost-sharing, and not industry-sponsored voluntary 
efforts.95 
 Why are Medicare physician services the lynchpin to slowing 
Medicare spending growth?  First, a large percentage of health costs 
are within the discretionary control of physicians,96 and the average 
primary care physician’s discretionary referrals display tremendous 
geographic and practice context variance.97 If Medicare does not 
control the volume of spending physicians direct, Medicare will find it 
difficult to tame costs.98  Second, despite a substantial body of 
empirical analysis on the control physicians exercise over 
discretionary health-care spending, Medicare physician payments 
have not been trending downward.99  Finally, the failure to give 
  
 91 Chapin White, Why Did Medicare Spending Growth Slow Down?, 27 
HEALTH AFF. 793, 795 (2008). 
 92 Id. at 795-96. 
 93 Id. at 796-97. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 793; Stuart Guterman et al., Using Medicare Payment Policy to 
Transform the Health System: A Framework for Improving Performance, 28 HEALTH 
AFF. w239 (2009). 
 96 Brenda Sirovich, et al, Discretionary Decision Making by Primary Care 
Physicians and the Cost of U. S. Health Care, 27 HEALTH AFF. 813, 814 (2008). 
 97 Howard Brody, Medicine’s Ethical Responsibility for Health Care Re-
form—The Top Five List, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 284 (2010). 
 98 Austin Frakt, Health Care Cost Control is Hard, and Humbling, 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Nov. 7, 2010, 7:00 AM), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/health-care-cost-control-is-hard-and-
humbling/. 
 99 Uwe Reinhardt, The Annual Drama of the ‘Doc Fix,’ ECONOMIX: N.Y. 
TIMES BLOG (Dec. 17, 2010, 6:00AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/the-annual-drama-of-the-doc-fix /. 
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physicians who participate in Medicare100 a financial and performance 
stake in efforts to control Medicare spending has left those most able 
to “bend the cost curve” on Medicare spending growth outside the 
circle of interest and power capable of exerting this control.101 
 
B.  What Is the Problem to Which the IPAB Is the 
Solution? 
 
The IPAB is designed as an independent fifteen-member board of 
the executive branch.  The IPAB’s members, most importantly, are to 
be full-time federal employees excluded from outside employment, 
and paid the salary of senior executives in the federal government.102  
Each member will be a presidential appointee with relevant expertise 
in health care, health economics, health research and technology, 
health insurance, and employer sponsors of health insurance.  The 
President is required to seek the advice and consent of various 
Congressional leaders in making twelve of these appointments, but 
retains exclusive authority over three of these six year 
appointments.103 
Given the duration of the exclusive service requirement, service 
on the IPAB might have to be seen as a career capstone project.  
Limiting likely service on the IPAB to those at the end of their career 
narrows the field of potential appointees.104 
The purpose of excluding outside employment is obviously to 
avoid any conflict of interest, though why prior service and retirement 
packages comprised of investment holdings in the entity are not a 
  
 100 These individuals are properly referred to as physicians who “accept 
Medicare assignment.”  42 C.F.R. § 414.50(b)(2) (2009). 
 101 See Steve M. Shortell, Bending the Cost Curve: A Critical Component of 
Health Care Reform, 302 JAMA 1223, 1223 (2009). 
 102 The salary of an IPAB member in 2011 is $165,300.  Rates of Basic Pay 
for the Executive Schedule (EX): Rates Frozen at 2010 Levels: Effective January 
2011, U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.opm.gov/oca/11tables/pdf/ex.pdf. 
 103 Memorandum from Christopher M. Davis, Analyst on Congress and the 
Legislative Process & Henry B. Hogue, Analyst in American National Government to 
Senator Tom Coburn (Mar. 18, 2011), available at 
http://coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3fe9e198-fe6c-
4fb2-9777-88c69ff72356. 
 104 Two witnesses at a July 2011 “House Energy and Commerce Health Sub-
committee session—American Enterprise Institute fellow Scott Gottlieb and George-
town Public Policy Institute professor Judith Feder”—indicated they had discussed 
IPAB appointment with the Obama administration. The Focus on Bringing Down 
IPAB, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2011/July/14/ipab.aspx?p=1.  
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problem is a mystery.  The purpose of the lengthy term of service is to 
send a strong message about the lack of revolving door opportunities 
for the IPAB appointees.  Willingness to serve (or lack thereof) under 
such stringent limitations will only become evident as the program is 
implemented.  
 
 C.  IPAB: Can It Work? 
 
Because Medicare physician payments are so huge, it is tempting 
to assume they are too large. But do we actually overpay for Medicare 
physician services? To answer this we need to understand how 
Medicare pays for physician services, how commercial insurance pays 
for physician services, and the perverse relationship between the two.  
 
 1.   The Sustainable Growth Rate Formula 
 
Earlier attempts have been made to tether the growth of Medicare 
physician payments to GDP growth.  Dating from the early 1990s, the 
“much hated”105 sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula has hovered 
over Medicare physician payment for decades.  The SGR formula 
requires cuts in Medicare reimbursements if total Medicare payments 
to physicians exceed GDP growth by a certain amount. 
However, SGR has never been implemented because Congress is, 
and has been, unwilling to lower fees for all services.106  The 
attraction of adjusting physician payments “with a scalpel”107 is that 
some physician services are overpaid while others do not even cover 
their costs. The challenge is to reduce the overvalued, raise the 
undervalued, and do it all with a budget neutral outcome.108 To 
attempt to gain the expertise necessary to accomplish this task, 
Congress established MedPAC. 
  
 105 Maggie Mahar, Comparing the Fiscal Commission’s Proposals to the 
Accountable Care Act, HEALTH BEAT BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http://www.healthbeatblog.com/2010/12/comparing-the-fiscal-commissions-
proposals-to-the-accountable-care-act.html. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 The relationship between Medicare payment system reform and the institu-
tionalization of comparative effectiveness concerns into Medicare has made IPAB a 
controversial entity.  IPAB’s broader portfolio of responsibilities raises the question 
of whether IPAB represent the introduction of command and control regulation into 
health care, where it is rarely found.  If the broader scope of responsibility makes 
IPAB a comparative effectiveness agency as much as a Medicare payment system 
reform entity, ought it not be explicitly acknowledged as such? 
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MedPAC is and always has been an exclusively advisory body.109  
Established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, MedPAC was 
designed to advise Congress on fee-for-service Medicare payment 
systems in addition to analyzing access and quality of care issues.  
MedPAC has seventeen members who serve three-year renewable 
terms on a part time basis. They are appointed by the Comptroller 
General.110  MedPAC issues two reports—March and June each 
year—to publicize its recommendations.111  
 
2.   Will IPAB Do Better than MedPAC? 
 
In contrast to the “oft-ignored” MedPAC,112 the IPAB is designed 
to demand Congressional attention.  Its recommendations become law 
unless the House and the Senate adopt resolutions to block them.  The 
default impact on the Medicare entitlement program will empower 
IPAB.  Rather than proposing alternatives to the Medicare fee-for-
service status quo, IPAB will drive the dimensions of the status quo.  
Congress must take affirmative action to derail IPAB’s power, if it 
wishes.  
MedPAC was not abolished by the ACA, however.  Nor is the 
IPAB going to be a super-MedPAC.113  MedPAC’s mandate to review 
the global health-care system is not replicated in the IPAB.  MedPAC 
also has substantial expertise to offer. MedPAC’s staff and expertise 
are so valued, in fact, that MedPAC lives on under the ACA as the 
Congressional advisory body that will review the IPAB’s 
  
 109 Senator Jay Rockefeller introduced legislation to transform MedPAC into 
an independent executive agency, modeled on the Federal Reserve Board, in May of 
2009.  Other failed proposals, including one from Senator Tom Daschle, were to 
create a health Fed designed to reach far beyond Medicare.  Laura Yao, MedPAC is 
Primed for Bigger Role in Health-Care Overhaul, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (June 3, 
2009, 4:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/06/03/medpac-is-primed-for-
bigger-role-in-health-care-overhaul. 
 110 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/hcac/medpac.html (last visited Jan. 
3, 2012). 
 111 See Documents, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/documents.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2011) (select “Reports” in the “Document Type” field), for these 
reports. 
 112 So the Commonwealth Fund’s health policy newsletter called it: John 
Reichard, Washington Health Policy Week in Review the Medicare Payment Advisory 




 113 Robert A. Berenson, Implementing Health Care Reform—Why Medicare 
Matters, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2010). 
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recommendations.  Whether or not the two entities will work in 
tandem or at odds, for the foreseeable future they will co-exist, one 
with the default authority to set Medicare payment policy and the 
other with the mandate to advise Congress as to the wisdom of these 
policy proposals.  It is ironic that MedPAC’s most forceful role yet 
may be as Congressional advisor on the IPAB.114 
 
3.  IPAB’s Governance  
 
IPAB’s governance and policy structure can be seen as a hybrid of 
three previous attempts by Congress to tie itself to the mast and so 
reduce political interference with extremely knotty and important, but 
ultimately technocratic questions.  These attempts resulted in the 
creation of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission (BRAC).115 
BRAC’s process began with published selection criteria for 
military base closures, Secretary of Defense recommendations to the 
independent commission, commission study (including public input) 
of these recommendations, and ultimately, commission 
recommendations to the President.  Like IPAB, Congress had a brief 
window of opportunity to act on the commission’s report (on an all or 
nothing basis) before the commission’s realignment and closure 
recommendations became law.116  Although the IPAB’s scope of 
authority is limited and based on a staged rollout, its decision-making 
structure is similarly designed to be insulated from external influence.  
The insight that “[e]veryone wants to lower costs until someone 
tries to lower costs”117 could not be more applicable to the IPAB or to 
Medicare reform in general.  Whether the IPAB can deliver what has 
been described as the framework for “learning to say no”118 will be its 
biggest challenge.  Although it is often thought that Medicare 
beneficiaries most need to learn this lesson,119 it is likely the IPAB 
  
 114 Reichard, supra note 112. 
 115 BRAC was created for a fixed term by the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990.  DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 305 (2005), available at 
http://www.brac.gov/docs/final/Chap2IssuesforFurtherConsideration.pdf. 
 116 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(3) (2010). 
 117 Benen, supra note 69.  
 118 Paul Krugman, Choices Must Be Made, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011, 
11:37 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/choices-must-be-made/. 
 119 Demand driven overconsumption by Medicare beneficiaries is traced to 
the moral hazard inherent in all insurance coverage and amplified by the substantial 
impact of Medicare secondary insurance (“Medigap”).  See David M. Zimmer, The 
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will have to deliver the message first to Medicare providers. 
 
V.  THE IPAB’S INITIAL PRINCIPLE ASSIGNMENT  
 
A.  Relative Value Units 
 
It is significant that the scope of the IPAB’s authority and the 
staging of its rollout combine to focus its first task on outpatient 
physician services. Physician services billed to Part B account for 
about 13 percent of all Medicare spending.120  Medicare uses a 
physician fee schedule to determine physician payment rates.  Values 
are assigned based on the amount of work required for a listed service, 
the expenses related to maintaining a practice,121 and liability 
insurance costs.  
Payments are updated yearly under the SGR formula, designed to 
keep Medicare spending growth “consistent with growth in the 
national economy.”122  The ACA establishes specific target growth 
rates for Medicare and appoints the IPAB the guardian of those 
goals.123  Just as physician conduct defeated the promise of the 
Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), discussed below, by 
raising the volume of services provided,124 Medicare Volume 
Performance Standards (VPS) have attempted to address increased 
Medicare physician service volumes, as to both frequency and 
intensity of services.  Physician payment system reform has 
repeatedly and sequentially vacillated between a focus on 
expenditures and a focus on costs without acknowledging the 
relationship between the two.125 
Relative weights or relative value units (RVUs) are the core of the 
MPFS.  RVUs are designed to account for the relative costliness of 
resources used to provide each service and reflect the relative levels of 
  
Relationship Between Medicare Supplemental Insurance and Health-Care Spending: 
Selection Across Multiple Dimensions, 38 E. ECON. J. 118 (2012). 
 120 Physician Services Payment System, MEDPAC 1 (Oct. 2010), 
www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_10_Physician.pdf. 
 121 Geographic adjustments reflecting regional differences in wages, rent and 
other costs are themselves controversial.  Robert Pear, Report Finds Inequities in 
Payments for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2011, at A18. 
 122 Congress has regularly specified an update outside of the SGR formula. 
Physician Services Payment System, supra note 120, at 1. 
 123 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, FRESH-
THINKING 2.0 MEDICARE WORKSHOP 1 (May 3-4, 2010), available at 
http://www.fresh-thinking.org/publications/IPAB_Jost.pdf. 
 124 William C. Hsiao, et al., Assessing the Implementation of Physician-
Payment Reform, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 928, 932-33 (1993). 
 125 JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 133 (2003). 
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time, effort, skill, and stress involved.126  Physician services, in short, 
have been distilled to these components: time, effort, skill, and stress.  
The origins of assigning relative weights to physician effort and skill 
trace back to the invention of RBRVS.  Harvard Medical School 
Professor William Hsiao rationalized the most common Medicare 
physician services in a kind of medical time study, based on his 
understanding of the time, effort, skill and stress involved in these 
services in 1992.127  These relative weights are updated at least every 
five years.  As reported by MedPAC, “in completing its review, CMS 
receives advice from a group of physicians and other professionals 
sponsored by the AMA and physician specialty societies.”128 
William Hsiao’s legacy is a system that systematically 
undervalues cognitive services, and systematically overvalues medical 
procedures.129  As a result, specialty physician services enjoy 
continued dominance in the delivery and budget of the Medicare 
program. 
At this point, one would expect an authorial team including an 
economist to sneer in Hayekian fashion at thumb-fingered government 
regulatory bureaucracies.  Government is one-size fits all and cannot 
process detailed information; private actors in markets are more 
efficient and flexible, economists might say.  They must, under 
pressure of competition, create better ways of classifying expenditures 
and reimbursing providers than the rigid command-and-control 
accounting system of Dr. William Hsiao.130 
If the economist co-author were to say this, however, he would be 
wrong.  It is a fact that the bulk of private insurers use Dr. Hsiao’s 
work and the RVS as a baseline against which to make their own 
  
 126 William C. Hsiao, et al., Estimating Physicians’ Work for a Resource-
Based Relative-Value Scale, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 835, 835-36 (1988); Physician 
Services Payment System: Payment Basics, MEDPAC 1 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_09_Physician.pdf. 
 127 Hsiao, supra note 126, at 835-36, 840.  William Hsiao’s seminar RBRVS 
research was conducted in 1985, published in 1988, adopted into the Medicare pay-
ment schedule in 1989, and took effect on January 1, 1992.  History of the RBRVS, 
AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-
managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-
relative-value-scale/history-of-rbrvs.page (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
 128 Physician Services Payment System, supra note 120, at 3. 
 129 Darshak Sanghavi, The Fix Is In: The Hidden Public-Private Cartels that 
Sets Health Care Prices, SLATE MAG. (Sept. 2, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2227082/. 
 130 See, most famously, F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 
AMER. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).  
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pricing and reimbursement decisions.131  The market cannot magically 
create information out of thin air.  It has to be created by somebody, 
somewhere—and that somebody is Medicare.  As the largest paying 
unit in America’s health-care system, it would be surprising if 
Medicare did not turn out to be both the price and the administrative 
process leader whose judgments are taken as a baseline that other 
purchasers use in making their own pricing and reimbursement 
decisions.132 
 
B.  The RVS Update Committee 
 
The AMA and several national medical specialty societies created 
the AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC) to inject 
its expertise into the RBRVS payment system review process.133  But 
it has not been without controversy. MedPAC’s March 2010 report to 
Congress recommended limiting Medicare’s unit prices,134 and the 
ACA requires HHS to periodically review these relative codes with 
special attention to potentially “mis-valued” codes.135  This is because 
CMS has shown tremendous deference to RUC recommendations.136  
RUC’s recommendations are accepted by CMS 94 percent of the 
time.137  Anything that disturbs the order of this will be worldview 
changing.  
CMS’s deference to RUC does not come after a long experiment 
with command and control regulation tempered by the 
acknowledgment that self-regulation may prove the wiser course.  The 
RUC has been captured since its inception.138  If capture represents a 
  
 131 Jon Harris-Shapiro and Marcia S. Greenstein, RBRVS—1999 Update, 26 J. 
HEALTH CARE FIN. 48, 48 (1999). 
 132 Henry G. Dove, Use of the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale for Pri-
vate Insurers, 13 HEALTH AFF. 193, 198 (1994). 
 133 Barbara Levy, The RUC—Providing Valuable Expertise to the Medicare 
Program for Twenty Years, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 28, 2011), 
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20, 20. 
 137 Joe Eaton, Powerful Medical Insiders Make Determinations on Medicare, 
CUTTING EDGE NEWS (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php? arti-
cle=21768&pageid=22&pagename=Investigation. 
 138 AM. MED. ASS’N, THE RUC: RECENT ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE 
VALUATION OF PRIMARY CARE SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Aug. 2008), avail-
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regulated industry dominating the creation and enforcement of a 
regulation,139 then the establishment and operation of RUC embodies 
capture of a more nuanced type. Here we have capture of the 
outpatient physician payment schedule by one group of providers to 
the exclusion of others.  Yet RUC is a poster child for how secret, 
unmonitored self-regulation does not manifest the upside of capture, 
where voluntary compliance improves regulatory outcomes.140 
It has been observed that “[a]lthough some consider the volume-
generating incentives of current payment systems so perverse that 
they would not spend much time correcting existing mispriced values 
. . . it will be necessary to correct mispricing and other flaws in 
existing fee-for-service payment systems in order to ultimately 
dismantle them.”141  Indeed, if we do not assess and correct for the 
contribution of overvalued services to Medicare’s cost-inflation, we 
run the risk of building the same defects into any future Medicare 
payment and delivery system.  The kind of morphic resonance142 that 
leads us to design a system that systematically undervalues the 
services we should value the most will require a thorough morphology 
to avoid replication.  IPAB’s assignment to consider RUC’s 
contribution to medical inflation, as a result, is both medically and 
politically freighted.143 
 
C.  Why Medicare Physician Reimbursement Relative 
 Value Units Should Matter to IPAB 
 
Medicare’s relative value scale is the foundation of the MPFS.  
The roughly 7,000 RVUs in Medicare’s relative value scale are 
supposed to reflect true relative practices costs.144  Rapid advances in 
  
intent was to include all major specialties, primarily defined as the 24 Member Boards 
of the American Board of Medical Specialties.”). 
 139 Dieter Helm, Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden, 22 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 169, 174 (2006). 
 140 Dorit R. Reiss, The Benefits of Capture 6-12, 45-46 (U.C. Hastings Col-
lege of Law Working Paper Series, 2011)  
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904023. 
 141 Berenson, supra note 113, at 103. 
 142 See Barbara S. Levy, AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee 
(RUC), NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.nhpf.org/library/handouts/Levy.slides_03-05-10.pdf. 
 143 See Berenson, supra note 113, at 102. 
 144 Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Little-Known Decision-Makers for Medicare Phy-
sicians Fees, ECONOMIX: N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/the-little-known-decision-makers-for-
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medical technology require RVU adjustments over time.145  The 
RBRVS determines prices based on physician work (52 percent), 
practice expense (44 percent), and malpractice expense (4 percent).  
Although all of the RBRVS components are contentious,146 CMS 
relies heavily on RUC to assist it with this task.147  RUC is a group of 
twenty-nine physicians drawn from a variety of medical specialties.  
Specifically, RUC is composed of a chair, six AMA committee 
representatives, and twenty-three members at large.148 
When RUC was first formed, representatives were requested from 
each of the specialties within the American Board of Medical 
Specialties, except for neurology.149  Medical specialties have evolved 
significantly since that time.  Although neurology is now represented 
on RUC, geriatricians, oncologists, and gastroenterologists are now 
excluded from RUC seats.  Neurology’s later addition is consistent 
with neurology’s transformation from a patient-oriented to a 
procedure-oriented focus.150 As each specialty delegate’s vote is 
limited to one equally weighted seat, the valuation of the work of all 
physicians is set by physicians almost entirely outside of the relevant 
specialty.151  Inevitably, patient-oriented services are systematically 
devalued.  The vast majority of voting status representatives on RUC 
are procedural- or surgery-focused specialties.152  Medicare requires 
  
 145 Id.  
 146 Practice expenses, for example, are based on residential and not profes-
sional office rental rates.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-119, Medi-
care Physician Fees: Geographic Adjustment Indices are Valid in Design but Data and 
Methods Need Refinement 18 (2005), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-119/pdf/GAOREPORTS-
GAO-05-119.pdf. 
 147 RUC was established by the AMA in 1991.  AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT 14 
OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES: THE RUC: RECENT ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE 
VALUATION OF PRIMARY CARE SERVICES 9 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/rucbotreport.pdf. 
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MEDSCAPE NEWS TODAY (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/747847. 
 149 Shaw, supra note 136, at 20. 
 150 See STEPHEN G. WAXMAN, FROM NEUROSCIENCE TO NEUROLOGY: 
NEUROSCIENCE, MOLECULAR MEDICINE AND THE THERAPEUTIC TRANSFORMATION OF 
NEUROLOGY vii (2005). 
 151 Medical specialties with RUC voting status include: anesthesiology, cardi-
ology, colon and rectal surgery, dermatology, emergency medicine, family medicine, 
general surgery, internal medicine, nephrology, neurology, neurosurgery, obstet-
rics/gynecology, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, otolaryngology, pathology, 
pediatrics, plastic surgery, pulmonary medicine, psychiatry, radiology, thoracic sur-
gery, and urology.  Shaw, supra note 136, at 21. 
 152 Id. at 20. 
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that all RUC relative value adjustments be budget-neutral as well. 153  
RUC, in short, pits representatives of “face time” or evaluation- 
and management-intensive providers against procedure-driven 
providers in the division of the MPFS pie.  The very composition of 
RUC favors providers of invasive, high-technology procedures over 
primary care and cognitive medicine providers. This outcome was 
predicted at RUC’s founding because of the rise of “lucrative 
outpatient diagnostic studies” as a growth sector.154 This prediction 
has been particularly prescient. Entire medical specialties—such as 
family practitioners and geriatricians—do few high-technology 
procedures, the sine qua non of relative value in the MPFS.  
Ironically, it is these same evaluation- and management-intensive 
primary care providers that approve or direct significant amounts in 
health-care spending per work day.155  
The current chair of RUC explains the weighting of procedural 
over cognitive specialties by noting that RUC was never meant to be a 
representative body.156 Although this rationale has been met with 
considerable scorn by primary care physicians,157 it contains more 
than a kernel of truth.  Primary care physicians bemoan their 
exclusion from RUC and the fact that each seat is filled by a physician 
who acts as an advocate for a given specialty.158  Nevertheless, the 
lessons that can be extracted from RUC’s “failed experiment”159 are 
substantial. 
 Specialty physicians dominate the RUC.  This has significance 
for both Medicare cost inflation and care delivery.  American 
medicine is specialty physician dominated, with primary care 
physicians160 comprising less than half of the total physician group.  
  
 153 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(p)(4)(C) (2010). 
 154 Shaw, supra note 136, at 21 (quoting Dr. Bruce Sigsbee, first representa-
tive of the American Academy of Neurology to the RUC). 
 155 See Thomas Bodenheimer, Bernard Lo & Lawrence Casalino, Primary 
Care Physicians Should Be Coordinators, Not Gatekeepers, 281 JAMA 2045, 2045 
(1999).  
 156 Anna Wilde Mathews, Dividing the Medicare Pie Pits Doctor Against 
Doctor, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303341904575576480649488148.ht
ml.  
 157 See generally REPLACE THE RUC!, http://replacetheruc.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2011). 
 158 Shaw, supra note 136, at 20. 
 159 Id. at 21.  
 160 Primary care physicians are defined, for purposes of government funded 
insurance, as internists, pediatricians, family practitioners, and geriatricians.  42 
C.F.R. § 414.66(a). Geriatricians have long sought a geriatrician designated seat on 
RUC but with no success to date.  See Press Release, American Geriatric Society, 
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By contrast, virtually all European countries have a broad generalist 
physician foundation comprising 70–80 percent of all practicing 
physicians.161  The conventional explanation for the primary care and 
specialty physician distribution in the United States is that primary 
care is underpaid and undervalued.  It is less-often noted that specialty 
care is concomitantly overvalued,162 and the mechanisms by which 
these perverse outcomes are institutionalized are rarely scrutinized.  
Without such scrutiny, it is hard to know how a system that rightly 
values the most efficient Medicare physician services can be 
implemented. 
RUC offers a vivid example of how administered pricing schemes 
can be captured by those who would benefit from overpayments.163  It 
has also been suggested that RBRVS is destined to produce mis-
valued codes and that overvalued codes will always lead to spending 
growth.164  If this is true, the problem with health-care 
overconsumption and overpayment is larger than the problem of 
Medicare physician payment.  If it is also true that an estimated 30 
percent of health-care services are unnecessary or duplicative,165 it is 
worth considering how to wring the most obvious inefficiencies out of 
the system.  Reforming RUC would be an excellent place to start. 
 
D.  Reforming RUC 
 
CMS has been urged to seek independence from RUC when 
recalibrating RVUs.166  MedPAC has recommended that an 
independent body of experts, composed of a group extending beyond 
physicians to economists and third-party payers, review RUC 
recommendations.167  It has also been suggested that the IPAB play 
  
Alan Lazaroff, MD, Appointed to RUC Administrative Subcommittee; Update on 
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mary Care—Specialty Income Gap: Why It Matters, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
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this role.168  These recommendations, of course, assume that the 
difficulties of government central planning in health-care markets 
would be remedied by a differently-composed RUC alone. 
Reformulating RUC would also have significant implications for 
inpatient care.  Just as outpatient Medicare physician services have 
been shaped by RUC’s role in recalibrating RVU’s, acute care 
hospitals have oriented much of their service provision toward high 
value RVUs and high value RVU specialty groups such as 
cardiology.169  
RUC operates in substantial obscurity.170  Although the identity of 
RUC appointees is available within the AMA, this information has not 
been widely circulated.  In addition to being disproportionately 
oriented towards procedural medical specialties, RUC’s current 
appointees are disproportionately male and southern171.  In addition, 
almost half of the members of RUC have financial relationships with 
pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology companies, device 
companies, health-care providers, and health insurance companies. 172  
Nevertheless, the AMA asserts that RUC members “exercise their 
independent judgment and are not advocates for their specialty.”173  
The effect of bias is difficult to measure since RUC’s votes are 
confidential174 RUC is reported to have a conflict of interest policy, 
although it is unknown.  The meetings are closed, but CMS is 
reported to have observers at each meeting.175 
  
 168 Reinhardt, supra note 144. 
 169 Id. 
 170 The AMA’s website does not list RUC membership by name, for example.  
The RVS Update Committee, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-
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HEALTH CARE RENEWAL, (Apr. 26, 2011, 5:26 PM), 
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 173 AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee, AM. MED. ASS’N, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/toptenthings.pdf (emphasis in original) 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
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public, except by invitation of the chair. Roy M. Poses, “Replace the RUC!”, HEALTH 
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The single most important thing to know about RUC is that it has 
used “flawed and capricious methodologies”176 to produce a system 
that is itself fundamentally flawed.  These flaws harm both patients 
and taxpayers.  Not coincidentally, they also harm primary care 
providers and purchasers.  The second most important thing to know 
about RUC is that it develops new RVUs, and CMS approves them.177  
Historically, it has taken several years to develop and value new 
codes.178  Needless to say, RUC moves slowly. 
RUC serves providers poorly, yet it not been abandoned by 
providers.  This is because RUC serves certain providers very well, 
and only disserves primary care providers.  The largest primary care 
medical society, the American Academy of Family Physicians 
(AAFP), is currently studying the implications of abandoning RUC.179 
The potentially destabilizing effect of such a decision by an entity 
representing roughly 10 percent of the country’s primary care 
providers cannot be ignored.  AAFP’s New Jersey and Florida 
chapters have already called for the AAFP to quit RUC.180  
Most recently, a Maryland-based group of primary care 
physicians has brought suit against CMS for ceding control of the 
Secretary’s rulemaking process to RUC and for failing to properly 
constitute the RUC as a Federal Advisory Committee.181   Although 
the case has only recently been filed, review of CMS’s memorandum 
in support of its 12(b)(6) motion indicates that CMS takes the position 
that RUC is a creature of the AMA and not a federal advisory 
committee.182  It remains to be seen whether the most significant 
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byproduct of this litigation will be an airing of RUC’s operation.  
What is clear is that CMS appears unwilling to cede ground on their 
position that the Medicare statute does not permit either 
administrative or judicial review of the determination of relative 
values.183 
Although primary care physician distaste for RUC is apparent, it 
is rarely noted that RUC also serves patients poorly, though it has not 
been attacked by patients.  This is because few patients understand 
RUC and the implications of its valuation of physician services for the 
quality, quantity, and cost of care that they receive.  Also, patients are 
the ultimate end-users of health care in our hybrid system.  As such, 
they are also often insulated from cost and a comprehensive 
understanding of health-care cost drivers. 
If RUC serves payors so poorly, why has it not been abandoned?  
Payors, including the biggest payor of them all, the United States 
government, have been reluctant to abandon RUC in light of the 
failure to identify a clearly superior alternative.  RUC embodies many 
of the flaws of self-regulated fee-for-service medicine while also 
embodying the political stalemate over funding physician services 
through government-funded health insurance, leaving many persuaded 
that progress is impossible.  In addition, primary care providers have 
not leveraged their role as the specialty care referral base into 
financial concessions from other physicians.184 
Even the modest proposal that any medical services valuation 
panel include a broader array of health-care experts (including non-
provider experts)185 has met with ferocious criticism from 
providers.186  More ambitious proposals (e.g., requiring CMS to fund 
direct surveys of medical practice and resources)187 scarcely see the 
light of day.  
It has become an anathema to mention financial incentives for 
physicians when discussing reform of payment for physician services 
under government-funded health insurance.  Yet, since physician 
decisions drive most health-care costs, it is impossible to address 
physician payment without addressing physician motivation.  As a 
  
 183 Id. at 14. 
 184 Klepper, supra note 180. 
 185 Reinhardt, supra note 144. 
 186 See, e.g., Klepper, supra note 180. 
 187 Robert Berenson proposed something very similar to this.  Joe Eaton, 
Powerful Medical Insiders Make Determinations on Medicare, THE CUTTING EDGE 
(Nov. 8, 2010) 
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=21768&pageid=89&pagenam
e=Features (quoting Robert Berenson on his efforts to promote better valuation by 
CMS). 
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result, in our public discourse we simply talk around the issue.  
Unfortunately, continued specialty physician dominance of the 
physician services valuation system stifles the discourse about 
whether physician services are appropriately valued and the larger 
discourse about self-regulation in government-funded health 
insurance.  Given the current stalemate over how to proceed, we 
might learn from the stalemate that plagues the debate regarding 
acceptable growth rates for physician services payments.  
 
E.  The Physician Payment Sustainable Growth Rate 
 Formula 
 
Controls on aggregate Medicare physician spending have helped 
suppress the growth of Medicare costs188over the last three decades.189  
The staged introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment systems 
have demonstrated that spending growth is responsive to policy 
interventions,190 but not all reforms have worked equally well in all 
settings.  Excess spending growth in physician and clinical services 
has proven particularly intransigent.191  The story of why this is so—
why excess Medicare spending growth in hospital care expenses has 
been tamed by changes in Medicare’s payment policies, and why 
excess Medicare spending growth in physician services has not—
helps to explain the IPAB’s design and function.  It is the story of the 
failure of Congress to implement Medicare’s SGR formula for 
Medicare physician services that helps to explain the IPAB’s impetus.  
Congress has affirmatively refused to change the payment 
incentives for doctors, while acknowledging physician decisions drive 
most health-care costs, because physicians have not embraced 
Medicare physician payment reform.192  Congress has now decided to 
take matters out of its own hands: “All Congress can do is fully 
replace an IPAB recommendation with a reform that saves the same 
amount of money or muster both a supermajority and a presidential 
  
 188 Medicare’s excess growth or spending growth beyond what may be attrib-
uted to general economic growth is often referred to as Medicare inflation or Medi-
care’s growth rate.  Bending the cost curve refers to the capacity to limit Medicare’s 
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Term Outlook for Health Care Spending, supra note 8. 
 189 White, supra note 91, at 796-97. 
 190 Id. at 795-98. 
 191 Id. at 796-97. 
 192 Ian Morrison, Chasing Unicorns: The Future of ACOs, HOSP. & HEALTH 
NETWORKS WKLY. (Jan. 3, 2011), 
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signature to stop IPAB from acting.  Either path requires a lot more 
effort than undermining cost control does right now.”193 
Ambivalent about physician reimbursement’s role in Medicare 
excess spending, Congress has intermittently frozen fee levels,194 
reduced fees for certain procedures,195 and introduced a fee schedule 
with spending targets.196  Even more ambivalent about its role in 
keeping excess Medicare physician growth in check, Congress has 
overridden the fee schedule consistently and regularly since its 
introduction in 1992.197  
The SGR formula requires that if the growth of Medicare’s total 
payments to physicians exceeds GDP growth by a certain amount in a 
given year, reimbursements will decrease.  Medicare adopted the SGR 
formula in the 1990’s as part of the Gingrich-Clinton balanced budget 
negotiations.  However, the SGR did not begin to bind until 2003, 
when the growth of Medicare’s total benefits per beneficiary exceeded 
the growth rate of GDP per capita.  Then the across-the-board cuts to 
physicians accepting Medicare assignments mandated by the SGR 
formula began to accumulate.  Congress promptly postponed 
implementation of the SGR.  Congress has yet to allow the SGR 
formula to kick in.  Because the SGR formula cuts Medicare 
payments to all physicians—well-compensated or otherwise —it has 
raised concerns of reduced access to care for Medicare beneficiaries.  
And, because the SGR formula is a rallying cry for organized 
medicine’s fear of falling income and status, it has a perverse 
usefulness to its proponents and opponents alike.  Unfortunately, 
“virtually everyone in Washington understands that the SGR formula 
will never be implemented.”198 
The cumulative unimplemented cuts are now projected to equal a 
29.4 percent SGR cut in the Medicare physician growth rate.199  
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Acknowledging that a January 1, 2012 29.5 percent cut to Medicare 
physician payments would be detrimental to beneficiary access to 
care,200 MedPAC urged Congress to resolve the SGR formula 
conundrum.  By October of 2011, MedPAC’s dissatisfaction with the 
SGR formula had escalated to the point of urging its repeal and 
replacement by a yearly schedule of specified updates for the 
physician fee schedule as well as a 17 percent across-the-board cut in 
Medicare specialty fees.201  But specialty physician pushback has been 
substantial.202 
In light of this, several options are now on the table. One option 
would be to embrace the 29.4 percent SGR-related cut to the Medicare 
physician growth rate.  This would almost certainly cause some 
contraction in those physicians accepting Medicare assignment, but 
would likely not lead to the alarmist prediction of the wholesale 
collapse of Medicare assignment.203  Among private physicians, 
Medicare is the preferred payer, with about 93 percent of American 
physicians willing to accept Medicare beneficiaries as patients.204  
Embracing the 29.4 percent SGR-related cut to the Medicare 
physician growth rate would mean Medicare might deepen its 
reputation as a less than optimal payor without harming its reputation 
as a reliable and, consequently, favored payor.205  If past is prologue, 
however, we are unlikely to have the chance to find out what such a 
significant cut to Medicare physician growth rate would mean for 




 200 See MEDPAC, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY xiv 
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A second option would, much as MedPac has only recently done, 
be to abandon the SGR formulation entirely and urge Congress to 
develop a revised physician payment system.207  Abandoning the SGR 
formulation would reduce provider interest in Medicare physician 
payment reform, however. 
A third option would be to use the looming SGR-related cut to 
generate pressure to establish a new Medicare physician services 
payment system, an approach advanced by the National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform.208 
Instead, Congress has routinely overridden the SGR and MedPAC 
continues to spin out proposals to resolve the SGR formula dilemma, 
most recently no fewer than four potential fixes centered around 
simply repealing the SGR. 
In the meantime, the ACA’s launch of the IPAB draws closer, in 
the face of a constitutional challenge to its validity.  This challenge, 
often hidden in the shadow of other constitutional attacks on the 
ACA, merits some thought. 
 
VI.   CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO IPAB  
  
A.  Separation of Powers 
 
The IPAB’s lynchpin is the limitation of specialty physician 
control over discussions about Medicare physician reimbursement.  
This process is described disparagingly as “government of, by, and for 
supposedly disinterested experts,”209 and the IPAB’s mission is to 
insulate the conversation about cost effective Medicare 
reimbursement rates from specialty provider dominance. The IPAB’s 
operational model does, in fact, substitute one group of 
congressionally-authorized and executive branch-selected health-care 
  
 207 See The Need to Move Beyond the Sustainable Growth Rate in Medicare: 
Hearing Before the House Energy & Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Health, 
112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Mark B. McClellan, Director, Engelberg Center 
for Health Care Reform), available at 
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Health/050511/M
cClellan.pdf (urging the Subcommittee to look beyond approaches that remain tied to 
the existing formula simply by delaying it again, or by resetting baselines to higher 
spending levels). See also, Abby Goodnough & Kevin Sack, Massachusetts Tries to 
Rein in Its Health Cost, N.Y. TIMES, October 18, 2011, at A1 (“Those who led the 
2006 effort to expand coverage readily acknowledged that they deferred the more 
daunting taks of cost control for another day.”) 
 208 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, supra note 71, at 31-35. 
 209 George F. Will,  Government by the ‘Experts,’ WASH. POST. (June 10, 
2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/government-by-the-
experts/2011/06/09/AGpU1KPH_story.html. 
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experts for the specialty physician experts who dominate RUC.  
Ultimately, both the status quo and the IPAB’s model involve 
extensive use of experts.  The status quo unofficially delegates 
authority to specialty physicians through the RUC process and the 
ACA explicitly delegates authority to the IPAB. 
Among the twenty-eight federal cases challenging the ACA, the 
Goldwater Institute’s Coons v. Geithner210 frames the separation of 
powers challenge to the IPAB’s organization around the broad 
authority delegated to the IPAB by Congress.  Asserting that the ACA 
“provides almost no limit on and no intelligible standard constraining 
the exercise of legislative power by IPAB,” the complaint seeks to test 
the modern parameters of Supreme Court deference to Congressional 
delegation of authority.211  
Congressional authority to delegate power under broad general 
directives is recognized as necessary for Congress to resolve 
especially technical problems.212  The limit on congressional authority 
to delegate lies in the requirement that Congress include an 
“intelligible principle” to guide the conduct of agent.213 
The IPAB’s statutory mandate is to find ways to “reduce the per 
capita rate of growth in Medicare spending.”214  This mandate is 
constrained by the requirements that the proposals be specific, focus 
on extending Medicare solvency, and protect and improve Medicare 
beneficiaries’ access to necessary and evidence-based items and 
services.215  The ACA’s guidance for the exercise of the IPAB’s 
discretion is substantial, substantially broader than the intelligible 
principle identified in the Emergency Price Control Act litigated in 
Yakus v. United States.  There, the congressional mandate was to set 
prices at levels “generally fair and equitable,”216 with the specific 
parameters of discretion read into the statute from the legislative 
history.217 The substantial discretion granted to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services in transforming the IPAB’s 
  
 210 Coons v. Geithner (Federal Health Care Lawsuit), GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 
(Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/coons-v-geithner-federal-
health-care-lawsuit. 
 211 Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 31, Coons v. Geithner, No.2:10cv1714 (D. Ariz., May 10, 2011). 
 212 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 213 Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928)). 
 214 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b) (2011). 
 215 Id.  § 1395kkk(c)(1)(A), 1395kkk(c)(2)(B)(i)(I)-(II) (2010). 
 216 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419-20 (1944) (delegating to an 
executive branch official the ability to set maximum wartime prices for commodities). 
 217 Id. at 420. 
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recommendations as they are forwarded to Congress raises questions 
about the permissible scope of the intelligible principle created to 
guide the conduct of the agent.218 
The IPAB’s authorizing legislation is remarkably detailed as to 
the limitations on its authority.  It is these very detailed limitations 
that make IPAB’s task so daunting.219  In addition, the Supreme Court 
has shown remarkable deference to congressional delegation of 
authority.  The only two Supreme Court cases indicating federal 
statutes lacked the necessary intelligible principle to constrain board 
or agency action concerned delegations of authority lacking the 
ACA’s substantial limitations on IPAB authority.220  In addition, no 
law has been struck down under a delegation challenge since the 
1930s.221  IPAB’s framers were careful to constrain its authority over 




In order to blunt resistance to Medicare by physician interest 
groups, President Lyndon Johnson proposed a payments system for 
Medicare with minimal oversight: doctors would charge Medicare 
what they charged their other patients for the services that they, the 
doctors, deemed to be medically appropriate.  But while private 
insurers and individuals paying out-of-pocket could, and did, inquire 
as to how appropriate and necessary the various procedures were, 
Medicare, as originally established, did not. 
By the 1980s it was clear that if Medicare was to be sustained 
over the long run it needed more oversight of the payments system.  
The option chosen was Dr. William Hsiao’s “medical Taylorism”:222 
determine how much it ought to cost to treat this condition and 
perform this service—based on the locality and the time, effort, skill, 
and stress involved—and then base Medicare reimbursement rates on 
  
 218 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720-21 (1986) (striking down the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as an unconstitutional exercise of executive power by 
the Congress under a scheme commanding the executive as to specific spending deci-
sions). 
 219 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (2010). 
 220 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-
42 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). 
 221 Peter Suderman, Scalia vs IPAB?, GOLDWATER INSTITUTE (July 15, 
2011),http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/scalia-vs-ipab. 
 222 The term we coin is an analogy to the Taylorist movement of the early 
twentieth century for the rationalization of industrial processes.  See FREDERICK W. 
TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC  MANAGEMENT 15 (1913) (“the self-evident 
fact that maximum prosperity can exist only as the result of the determined effort of 
each workman to turn out each day his largest possible day’s output”). 
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that determination.  Once again, however, the system is out of 
balance.  Just as insurance company regard for bottom lines and 
household regard for individual spending were missing from the 
original system, so too the current system overvalues specialty 
medical procedures, because specialists have the expertise, free time, 
and incentive to shape the process in their own interest. 
The IPAB is designed to redress this imbalance.  With publicly-
announced membership and open procedures, the IPAB is designed to 
bring conversations over Medicare physician compensation into the 
public forum.  The Obama administration is placing many of its long-
run hopes for sustaining the social insurance system on the IPAB.  
Even though the IPAB will not to spring into existence until 2012, 
throughout 2011 the same principles governed President Obama’s 
federal health-care spending control strategy:  “by strengthening an 
independent commission of doctors, nurses, medical experts, and 
consumers who will look at all the evidence and recommend the best 
ways to reduce unnecessary spending while protecting access to the 
services that seniors need.”223 
Expert boards have always run the risk of being captured by the 
industry that they are supposed to regulate.  Indeed, the Medicare 
reimbursement process has already been captured, and the need to 
substitute an open and informed process for the RUC’s rubber-
stamping of specialist-driven outpatient physician service valuation is 
great.  The Medicare payment systems bellwether status means that 
commercial insurance consumers and payers would also benefit from 
bringing the discussion of the systematic overvaluation of specialty 
care and devaluation of primary care out into the open. 
The ACA is peppered with programs designed to raise the status 
and value of primary care providers.  But all of this will be for naught 




 223 President Barack Obama, Speech on Reducing the Budget (Apr. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/us/politics/14obama-text.html. 
